This is not to say that shadow banking played no role at all in the UK, but this was an 'old' form of shadow banking, different from the 'new' shadow banking that was so prominent in the credit losses and liquidity problems of the US financial system in [2007] [2008] . The 'new' shadow banking is characterised by substantial maturity mismatch and funding through 'deposit like' liabilities (short term money-like assets, notably shares in money market mutual funds, regarded as entirely safe but without deposit guarantees or the liquidity support provided by direct access to the central bank lender of last resort facility). The 'old'
shadow banking consists of non-bank credit providers that rely to an important extent on borrowing from established banks, and where they borrow in money markets do so on an uncollateralised basis (so their liabilities are recognised as relatively risky short term investments, not entirely safe substitutes for bank deposits).
We show that, in contrast to the situation in the US in the run-up to the crisis of 2007-2008, almost all the domestic (i.e. sterling lending) in the UK was extended directly or indirectly by established UK regulated banks and most of the associated risks were retained on their balance sheets. In comparison to the US, shadow banks played and lesser and more conventional role in the form of specialised financial intermediaries, such as REITs and other property investment companies, which borrowed from the established banking sector to finance investment in commercial property; 'new' shadow banks did not significantly compete with the established banks for short term deposit and wholesale sterling funding.
The paper is organised a follows. Section 2 reviews the existing literature on shadow banking and its role in the build of up systemic risk before the recent global financial crisis.
Section 3 then uses available Bank of England data to examine both the build of credit and subsequent UK sterling banking losses during the years 1997 -2013 and the role of shadow banking in their finance. Section 4 provides a brief comparison with earlier episodes of property related banking losses in the UK in 1973-74 and 1991-1993 . Section 5 concludes.
Shadow banking and the global financial crisis
A substantial recent literature has addressed the role of shadow banking during the global financial crisis of [2007] [2008] , focussing largely on US experience. There are two reasons for this focus on the US: in the years preceding the crisis a large US dollar 'shadow banking' system emerged that played a key role in financing the subprime mortgage lending in the United States. The literature though has largely ignored 'shadow banking' in other currencies, primarily for the reason that data on the structured credit securities and other instruments are much more readily available for the US than for other countries. This section reviews this literature, emphasising the contrast between the way shadow banking has recently operated in the US ('new' shadow banking) with the way in which it has operated in other countries and at other times ('old' shadow banking).
Although most work on shadow banking refers to US experience, there has more recently 
'New' versus 'old' shadow banking
The Financial Stability Board defines shadow banking as 'credit intermediation involving entities and activities outside the regular banking system'. 2 This broad definition includes, for example, specialised or offshore banks subject to lighter regulation and scrutiny than established banks, as well as non-bank intermediaries. Within this broad definition, it is useful to contrast two characterisations of shadow banking, which we label respectively as the 'new' and 'old'. The new characterisation dominates much of the current research literature (Adrian and Shin 2009; Pozsar et al. 2010; G. B. Gorton and Metrick 2010; Singh 2010; Pozsar and Singh 2011) , but we will argue that the experience of the UK which we examine is better characterised as 'old' shadow banking. 3 Four key features of this 'new' US dollar shadow banking (or rather shadow banking system) are: first and most importantly that it engaged in extensive maturity transformation using 2 (Financial Stability Board 2013) 3 Our distinction between 'old' and 'new' is reflected in the past usage of the term shadow banking. It seems to have been first used to describe what we call 'new' shadow banking by (McCulley 2007) , but had previously been used to refer to what we call 'old' shadow banking, for example by (Bradshaw 2004). liabilities (shares in money market mutual funds) that investors regards as extremely safe and therefore as close substitutes for bank deposits; second that it provided intermediation from ultimate savers (households and companies) right through to ultimate borrowers (a wide range including sub-prime mortgage borrowers and other lending secured on property)
entirely outside of the established banking system; third that is operates without the liquidity support provided by access to the lender of last resort facility from the central bank and is thus subject to runs; and fourth and finally that it made extensive use of innovative instruments such as credit derivatives, structured credit securities and various forms of collateralised short term funding, both on and off balance sheet, in order to transform illiquid loans into apparently safe and liquid short term liabilities.
While the recent literature has focused almost exclusively on this 'new' shadow banking and its role in the build up of both credit and liquidity risk in the US over the years 2002-2007, a different and older form of shadow banking has appeared in many other jurisdictions and on previous occasions, making little or no use of the technologies of securitisation, repo and credit derivatives and not perceived as creating liabilities that are a close substitute for bank deposits. In this 'old' form of shadow banking smaller institutions, operating offshore or under looser regulatory oversight than established banks, provide an important share of domestic credit; but this shadow bank lending is funded by some combination of direct lending from established banks and short term unsecured money market borrowing i.e. its short-term liabilities are explicitly recognised as being risky. Frequently these shadow banks satisfy the substantial demand for lending in property booms, providing secured lending on residential and commercial property. Examples of losses arising from this 'old' form of shadow banking include the UK in 1973 -75 and 2008 and Thailand in 1997 Other examples go back at least as far as the failure of US trust companies during the panic of 1907.
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To sum up the 'new' US dollar shadow banking that emerged during the years [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] used structured credit securities as repo collateral for raising short term money market finance, especially from money market mutual funds that captured deposits away from 4 The UK examples are documented later in this chapter. For Thailand see Leightner and Lovell (1998) , Alba, Hernandez, and Klingebiel (1999) and Charumilind, Kali, and Wiwattanakantang (2006) . 5 See Moen and Tallman (1992) and Frydman, Hilt, and Zhou (2012) traditional banks. This in turn allowed credit to be extended directly to borrowers without direct intermediation by banks. The literature on this 'new' shadow banking emphasises the demand for money-like assets i.e. liquid, risk free interest-bearing assets that can be exchanged without requiring costly assessment of their value. But other forms of shadow banking ('old' shadow banking) have emerged at other times and in other jurisdictions, engaged in conventional lending, and funded either directly by banks or with liabilities that were recognised as being riskier than bank deposits. Figure 1 and documented in our Section 3 below. In the UK in these years sterling shadow banking was primarily funded directly by traditional deposit and credit institutions, not from money markets; and these UK shadow banks made relatively little use of structured credit instruments, rather they mostly provided credit directly to borrowers.
6 Some further interpretation of this figure can be offered: • A further dimension, not fully captured in the figure, is the role of money market (short term) lending, both secured and unsecured. Money market intermediation is a major source of short term funding to commercial banks, leveraged credit funds and specialised lenders, and also to broker/dealers and (via direct investment in short term paper) private non-financial companies. Maturity mismatch using short term money-market instruments has contributed to many episodes of financial borrowing: its main sources of wholesale funding was through the issue of mortgage backed securities and covered bonds (see Milne and Wood (2008) ). The reason that it got into liquidity problems was that it adopted a practice of lending first, using unsecured money market borrowing as a temporary source of funds, before later transferring repackaging loans into mortgage backed securities. When the markets for securitisation froze in 2007 it had no alternative source of funding available to it. 7 See Milne (2009a) In order to highlight the differences between 'new' and 'old' shadow banking, this subsection, and the one following, contrast the operation in recent years of shadow banking in US dollar markets with the shadow banking that developed in Europe and the UK.
According to Gorton (2010a) the ability to diversify their loan portfolios, and hence back bank deposits with comparatively safe if illiquid assets, made banks historically the natural suppliers of deposit money; but the new technologies of securitisation, secured lending (repo) and the hedging of associated default risk using credit derivative allowed non-bank intermediaries to displace traditional banks in the supply of seemingly riskless short-term liabilities backed by illiquid long term lending.
The most important of these liabilities was the sale or repurchase agreement (or repo), a form of secured borrowing. By agreeing to sell an asset and then subsequently repurchase 10 Some references from an extensive literature include Goodhart and Delargy (1998) ; Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) ; Davis and Zhu (2004) ; Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). at a slightly higher price, a borrower pays the equivalent of an interest rate; but risk is limited by the practice of requiring 'haircuts', i.e. the extent to which the actual market value of the asset (for example $100) exceeds the agreed repurchase price (for example $95). 11 Another important form of secured borrowing used to finance securitised loans was 'asset backed commercial paper' or ABCP, a short term tradable paper secured on structured credit securities. The rapid growth in the issue of mortgage backed securities and other structured credit assets, financed using these various forms of short term borrowing, came to a sudden halt in mid-2007. A major reason was the lack of transparency regarding underlying asset quality:
investors were acquiring shadow banking exposures with little regard to which assets were safe and which had more underlying risk; asymmetric information became an inherent problem.
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As depositors panicked, the highly liquid market shrank drastically and liquidity vanished. Metrick (2010, 2012) interpret the crisis of 2007-09 as a banking panic centred on the repo market and triggered by a loss of confidence in structured credit securities. This created feedback effect in which stronger balance sheets feed greater demand for the asset, which in turn raises the asset's price and lead to stronger balance sheets; while weakening balance sheets trigger the reverse mechanism, a mechanism that had been analysed even before the crisis by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008) .
To illustrate this mechanism, ( Gorton and Metrick 2009 ) document the dramatic rise in haircuts across asset classes. Before the financial crisis, haircuts were close to zero for many asset classes, and only a little higher at around 5% when using on subprime mortgage 11 In this case the haircut of $5 ($100-$95) protects the repo lender from loss in the event of default, because even if the value of the asset should fall by $5 they can still sell the asset and get back the money owed ($95). 12 For description and discussion see (Pozsar et al. 2010 ) 13 For elaboration see for example Ashcraft and Schuermann (2008) and Gorton (2009). backed securities and related assets as collateral. From July 2007 onwards the haircuts on subprime mortgage backed and related securities rose rapidly eventually climbing to 100%;
i.e. these assets were no longer acceptable as collateral in repo. Haircuts on non-subprimerelated asset classes also rose sharply to a maximum of 20%.
A related mechanism that again contributed to the panic was that of rehypothecation, i.e.
the practice of re-using collateral that had been obtained in return from extending repo finance in order to raise funds. In this way collateral could be passed on in a chain from one institution to another. Singh and Aitken (2009) 14 However this is not the 'shadow banking' that proved so unstable during the global crisis, because most of these agency securities were held by long term investors without maturity mismatch.
An alternative measure is to look at total repo borrowing. Gorton (2010b) estimates the US repo market to have been $12 trillion in 2007 just before the crisis, compared with the total assets in the US banking system of $10 trillion. Hördahl and King (2008) claim that the former top US investment banks funded roughly half of their assets using repo markets, with additional exposure due to off-balance sheet financing of their customers. The collateral often consisted of securitized loans and other structured credit instruments. Gorton and Metrick (2012) estimate that net repo financing provided to broker dealers fell 14 For a detailed discussion see Pozsar, et al (2010) . All these repo based estimates, however, substantially overstate the total amount of shadow banking, because only a share of repo finance is used to support bank like credit intermediation. A better approach is to identify more directly the type of intermediation supported by different groups of institutions, an approach adopted by the Financial Stability
Board and described in the next subsection. This approach suggests that US shadow banking (excluding the GSEs) was only around $3trn at end 2012.
Shadow banking in the Euro area and the United Kingdom
Having described US dollar shadow banking, we now review available statistical information on shadow banking in Euro and sterling markets in the years before and after the global financial crisis. Our main conclusion is that, while there is considerable uncertainty about the amount of shadow banking intermediation, the overall amount of credit intermediation by shadow banks independent of the established banking system remains relatively small in other currencies than the US dollar. This is consistent with the fact that Euro and sterling securitization took place on a much smaller scale than in US dollars and these securities were to a much larger extent retained on bank balance sheets, for example to be used as collateral for borrowing from the Bank of England and the ECB. engaged in credit intermediation and exposed to bank like risks from leverage and maturity mismatch, but to date their statistics do not provide this level of disaggregation.
A further concern with the FSB measures, especially when looking at their reported figures for individual jurisdictions, is that they do not distinguish offshore intermediation between non-domestic investors and borrowers, from onshore intermediation. This boosts the magnitude of other financial intermediation relative to GDP in jurisdictions with substantial offshore activity such as the UK, Hong Kong and some parts of the Euro area. 13% in the UK, but many outside the US were in fact holding US dollar assets); finance companies (in our terminology 'old' shadow banks) were also around $5trn; money market mutual funds were about $4 trillion; real estate investment trusts less than $1trn.
An alternative attempt to estimate the magnitude of shadow banking in the Euro area and the UK can be found in Bouveret (2011) (see Table 1 Association, EFAMA), central banks or commercial providers (Lipper). In 2010Q4 MMFs were measured as EUR 1182 billion (EFAMA), or EUR 1132 billion (ECB), or 1120 billion (Lipper). Commercial paper info is taken from the ECB and the STEP (Short Term European Paper) programme. In 2010Q4 CP was EUR 411.3 billion. Contrary to the US CP market, the European CP market did not experience a downturn during 2008Q4, and instead stabilized in early 2009. ABS info is taken from AFME (Association for Financial Markets in Europe). In 2010Q4 ABS balances were EUR 2090 billion. September 2010, around EUR 500 billion of ABS were held on repo at the ECB according to AFME (2011), accounting for 24% of total collateral posted. Repo data is taken from the International Capital Market Association (ICMA). December 2010, value of repo contracts outstanding was EUR 5908 billion. While the European repo market declined during the crisis (by roughly 30% between 2008Q2 and 2008Q4), it has since increased. The US repo market declined by more than 50% from 2008Q2 to 2010Q4.
A more detailed examination of Bouveret's numbers, shown in Table 1 , suggests that there are problems with the interpretation of these estimates, especially for Europe. First there is considerable double counting, arising from the inclusion of both shadow banking liabilities (money market mutual funds, repo) and shadow banking assets (structured credit securities) in the total estimate of aggregate shadow banking. Second, like researchers examining the size of the US shadow banking, Bouveret does not distinguish between the use of repo to finance holdings of structured credit instruments from their use to finance other positions including taking both long and short positions in government and corporate bonds.
Bouveret adds repo and reverse repo and dividing by two to obtain an average figure; 17 but a brief examination of the figures for repo finance in bank accounting statements suggests 17 Reverse repo is simply the other side of a repo contract, so repo is used for collateralised borrowing of money by offering a security as collateral, while reverse repo is used to lend money while in return holding a security as collateral.
that this could exaggerate the amount of net repo funding available to finance holdings of structured credit instruments by ten or more times. 
Shadow banking and the UK credit expansion
This section documents, using available data, the UK credit expansion of 1997-2008 and the role played by 'shadow banking', wholesale funding and securitisation to support the expansion of UK credit. It also compares this episode with the earlier property related credit losses of 1973-74 and 1991-93.
UK credit expansion prior to the crisis
All the data presented here are for sterling money and credit of UK monetary and financial institutions. 19 Foreign currency lending and deposit takes place in the UK on a large scale but this is not part of the UK credit expansion since it is overwhelmingly off-shore banking in which both borrowers and depositors are non-residents. Table C further analysis of deposits and lending, the breakdown of intermediate OFI lending in Dec 2012 was as follows: loans to 'activities auxiliary to financial intermediation' (apparently fund management) £121bn, 'intra-group lending' £150bn, lending to securitisation special purpose vehicles £19bn, loans to bank holding companies £29bn, loans to non-bank credit grantors £13bn, and loans to mortgage and housing credit corporations £55bn, a total of £387bn. The corresponding sterling deposits and repos were: from securitisation special purpose vehicles £212bn, Intragroup deposits £110bn, from bank holding companies £18bn, from mortgage and housing credit corporations £14bn, from non-bank credit grantors £2bn, and finally from fund management companies £60bn. 1983 Q3 1984 Q4 1986 Q1 1987 Q2 1988 Q3 1989 Q4 1991 Q1 1992 Q2 1993 Q3 1994 Q4 1996 Q1 1997 Q2 1998 Q3 1999 Q4 2001 Q1 2002 Q2 2003 Q3 2004 Q4 2006 Q1 2007 Q2 2008 Q3 2009 Q4 2011 Q1 2012 Q2 The relatively rapid growth of M4 lending to the non-financial private sector, relative to the stock of retail deposits, is shown in Figure 3 . 23 1983 Q3 1984 Q4 1986 Q1 1987 Q2 1988 Q3 1989 Q4 1991 Q1 1992 Q2 1993 Q3 1994 Q4 1996 Q1 1997 Q2 1998 Q3 1999 1965 Q3 1967 Q3 1969 Q3 1971 Q3 1973 Q3 1975 Q3 1977 Q3 1979 Q3 1981 Q3 1983 Q3 1985 Q3 1987 Q3 1989 Q3 1991 Q3 1993 Q3 1995 Q3 1997 Q3 1999 Much of this lending is captured by the data base series RPQTBUT 'Sterling lending to firms involved in undertaking the buying, selling and renting of real estate' (column (2) of Table 2 The sum of these two property related lending series rose from 5 per cent of GDP in 1997 to around 25 percent of GDP at the beginning of the crisis. Over the same period residential mortgage lending rose from 52 percent to 85 percent of UK GDP. Taken together with a much smaller rise in lending to property construction companies (column (1) of Table 2) from about 1 percent to 2 percent of GDP, property related lending accounts for all of the increase in sterling M4 lending relative to GDP during the credit expansion of 1997-2007.
Non-property related lending (column (6) of Table 2 ) actually fell slightly over the same period. This was an old fashioned property lending boom. While the credit boom of 1997-2008 was dominated by lending on residential and commercial property, the risks exposures that resulted from this lending varied considerably from one category of loan to another; and also, depending on the quality of their loan books, from one lender to another. Table 3 shows five year cumulative loan write offs, for major categories of lending, again taken from Bank of England Statistics. for very close to three-quarters of all of these UK sterling loan write-offs.
Despite the very large increase in the ratio of residential mortgage lending to GDP, writeoffs on residential mortgage loans to individuals accounted were only £3.4bn, 5% of the total write-offs and less than ½ percent of the 2008 stock of residential mortgages. Similarly low write off rates were recorded for lending to other financial corporations and to nonresidents. Finally about £10bn of write-offs, 14% of the total, are against non-financial corporations not involved in commercial real estate.
Although credit card lending and unsecured personal lending both made a substantial contribution to total write-offs on sterling lending, the increase in UK sterling loan write-offs in this period (compared to the previous five years) is mostly from lending to non-financial corporations (and most of this was on commercial real estate lending). Comparing the first and fourth columns of Table 3 this category of write-offs accounts for £24bn of a total £35bn increase in write-offs, between 2003-2008 and 2008-2013 . Write-offs on credit cards rose by only just over £5bn, on mortgage by just under £3bn, while write-offs on other unsecured personal lending actually fell from £15.7 to £15.0bn.
The high level of write-offs on credit cards and other unsecured personal lending reflects the fact that these categories of loans are always risky, regardless of the state of the wider macroeconomy. This is not such a problem to banks because the high levels of write-offs are anticipated and therefore interest rates on these forms of lending are set at sufficiently high levels to cover anticipated losses. The large increase in write-offs on loans to commercial real estate was a much bigger problem for UK banks because it was not anticipated; and therefore interest rates on this secured and therefore supposedly safe lending were far too low to absorb the losses. 24 The breakout of write-offs for CRE lending is not available in the BoE database, and hence not distinguished in this table, but it is reported by Benford and Burrows (2013a) .
These write-offs of domestic sterling exposures were not the only source of losses, to UK owned banks and to other banks operating in the UK. Other major losses arose from (a) trading losses, including especially losses on investments in US dollar structured credit securities; (b) losses on lending outside of the UK, principally those of HSBC on its North
American subsidiary HFC; (c) the large write-down of the Royal Bank of Scotland share of the acquisition of ABN-AMRO bank. Table 4 compares some measures of these further losses with those shown in Table 3. 25 Table 4 : comparison of sterling credit write-offs with other losses £bn UK sterling credit write-offs (from Table 3 Table 3 does show is that these UK sterling credit write-offs in Table 1 of 1973-1975 and 1991-1993 . As in the earlier crises there was a rapid growth of property related lending, through both residential mortgage lending and lending secured on commercial real estate.
One difference from 1991-93 is that this most recent growth in mortgage lending was followed by relatively modest write-offs of mortgage loans. The most obvious explanation for this is that in 1990-91 short term interest rates were maintained at very high levels in an effort to keep sterling within the European exchange rate mechanism. In the most recent period, in sharp contrast, short term interest rates were reduced sharply. This however did not prevent substantial write-offs on unsecured personal lending and on commercial property lending.
To what extent was this related to shadow banking? Figure 6 and 7 reports some indicators of UK shadow banking activity. The most salient feature of these charts is the substantial growth in issue of residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) in Figure 6 , from less than 2 per cent of GDP in 1999 to nearly 27 per cent of GDP at the start of the crisis in 2007 i.e.
an increase of 25 per cent of GDP matching the increase in residential mortgage lending (Figure 4 ) over the same period from 52 to 77 per cent of GDP.
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Regrettably there are no statistics on the holding of these sterling residential mortgage backed securities: some tranches will have been placed in conduits used by the issuing banks to raise funding; other tranches will have been sold to long term investors; yet other tranches will have been purchased as trading assets by other banks or by hedge funds. Still, regardless of who was purchasing the securitisations, most risk will have been retained by the issuing banks. This is because even before the crisis only low risk mezzanine and senior tranches of RMBS could be readily sold.
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The AFME statistics used for Figure 6 also provide a breakdown of different types of securitisation in the UK (but without distinguishing sterling from foreign currency). These figures indicate that total outstanding securitisation in the UK in 2007Q2, was equivalent to 49% of GDP (about one fifth higher than the Sterling securitisation shown in Figure 6 ), with 26 Bank of England data for securitisation in Figure 6 is available only back to 2010Q1, but this matches fairly well with the other series reported in Figure 6 , AFME data for sterling securitisation that goes back to 1999. 27 Milne (2009) chapters 4-6 discusses the role of securitisation in the global financial crisis in detail. There was no equivalent in sterling markets of the "ABS-CDOs" used to resecuritise unsold junior tranches of US$ RMBS.
securitised residential mortgage backed securities amounting to 31% of GDP, securitised commercial mortgage backed securities 8% of GDP and all other securitisations (credit cards, business loans and "collateralised debt obligations or CDOs") adding up to 10% of GDP i.e.
residential mortgage backed securitisation was much more important than any other form of securitisation in the UK. Finally Figure 6 shows sterling repo financing by monetary financial institutions. This is much smaller than securitisation, but the series are not really comparable.
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Source: Bank of England Interactive Statistical Data Base; Association of European Financial Markets (AFME) Figure 7 shows two indicators of property related lending (other than residential mortgages provided to individuals), both taken from Table 2 sheet vehicles were unable to obtain short term funding in the markets, banks were forced to lend to the vehicles they sponsored, increasing lending to Housing and Mortgage
Corporations shown in Figure 6 substantially from 5% to 13% of GDP. This need to lend then declined as the Bank of England provided substantial repo finance secured against RMBS and CMBS.
Source: Bank of England Interactive Statistical Database and author's calculations. Real estate agents and funds is an umbrella term including both agencies that provide services for the purchase of and sale of residential and commercial real estate and property companies that invest in real estate. Housing and Mortgage Credit Corporations includes a range of non-bank entities that hold assets secured on residential housing, including until 2009Q4 special purpose vehicles (SPV) used for securitisation of residential mortgages.
As described by (Benford and Burrows 2013) banks, and used as a tool to secure further funding to continue the credit expansion. While banks were using off balance sheet vehicles to raise short term funding using securitised loans as collateral, the amount of 'emergency' lending to these vehicles suggested by Figure   7 , was only about 5% of GDP, indicates that the size of these off balance sheet vehicles was much less than total sterling securitisation.
The second conclusion -is that the main exposure that led to the large increase in sterling loan write-offs (shown in Table 3 ) was a substantial increase in rather conventional lending to property companies. Some form of 'shadow' banking may have played a secondary role in this boom and subsequent bust, but this was through REITs and other leveraged investment funds investing in commercial property (see Benford and Burrows (2013) for more detailed discussion of the activities of these other investors in commercial property).
Comparison with the UK banking losses of 1973-74 and 1991-1993
This section briefly compares the most recent episode of bank credit losses in the UK with earlier episodes of 1973-74 and 1991-1993 .
The 1973-74 shadow banking crisis has been documented in some detail by Reid (1982) .
While sterling foreign exchange controls continued to be applied until 1979, a gradual deregulation of domestic UK banking occurred from the late 1950s until the early 1970s. The relaxation of strict controls of lending for the purchase of consumer durables ("hire purchase") led to the creation of a number of finance groups seeking to provide loans to consumers and smaller businesses, but they had no banking license and their legal status as banks was unclear. As recognised in a famous judgement ((United Dominions Trust Ltd v. Kirkwood BT -QB 1966) ) by Lord Denning, Master of the Rolls, these finance houses had a claim, under UK common law, to be regarded as banks simply by virtue of having practiced a lending business with rights to reclaim debts, and having been accepted as such by the investors and financial intermediaries that funded them. The banking sector problems of 1991-93, like the earlier episodes of 1973-75 and 2007-2012, were driven by a property lending cycle in which smaller 'shadow' banks participated. In 1991 there were 116 small banks in the UK, a large proportion of which engaging in lending secured on residential and commercial property lending; of these by 1993 25 had failed. But these shadow banks (in our terminology 'old' shadow banks because while much less closely regulated than the established banks they were not competing for deposit like liabilities)
accounted for a very much smaller share of total credit provision than the secondary banks in 1973. Logan (2000) reports the total assets of the 92 small banks for which he was able to assemble data amounted to only £15bn (2.6% of 1991 GDP) compared to the total assets of Barclays, the largest UK banking group at the time, which had total assets of £138bn (23.2%
of GDP).
As 
Summary and conclusions
This paper has examined the expansion of credit prior to the financial crisis of [2007] [2008] [2009] and the subsequent loan losses in UK sterling lending. A central question we have addressed is the role of new forms of intermediation ('shadow banking') and new credit instruments.
We have reviewed the literature on shadow banking (Section 2); examined magnitude, financing and subsequent losses on the credit expansion of UK banks and the role played in this episode by shadow banks (Section 3) and provided a brief comparison with the earlier episodes of property related credit losses in UK domestic lending in 1973-75 and 1991-93 (Section 4).
We draw a distinction between 'old' shadow banking, taking funds from the established banking system, from 'new' shadow banking, using the modern tools of securitisation and credit risk transfer in order to create money-like substitutes for traditional bank deposits and hence disintermediate entirely from the established banks. We argue (Section 2) that while 'new' shadow banking of this kind played an important role in the US, by-passing commercial bank intermediation, it did not operate in this way in the markets for Euro and sterling lending. The only element of the 'new' shadow banking, of the kind described by relevant to UK domestic (sterling) lending was the extensive use of securitisation, especially of residential mortgages, in the years preceding the crisis but these securitisations were all conducted by established UK banks, not by competing shadow banks.
Bank of England statistics reveal that residential mortgage lending led to relatively modest losses for UK banks in the period 2008-2013. Losses on sterling exposures emerged instead, primarily from lending secured on commercial property and unsecured personal lending, with most of the increase in losses associated with commercial property. This was a property boom (as documented by Benford and Burrows (2013b) commercial property lending increased to about two-thirds of total UK bank lending to the non-bank corporate sector (by UK owned and foreign banks)) followed, subsequently, by substantial loan losses.
A form of 'old' shadow banking played some role in this boom and bust, with real estate investment trusts and other specialised real estate funds investing in commercial property.
In this respect the most recent episode of loan losses has some parallel to the UK lending Apart though from this novelty, the widespread use of securitisation to fund loan expansion, this was a very old-fashioned banking crisis.
